The Lies of the Iranian Nuclear Program
Iran has a rich past when it comes to deceiving the world in hiding the illegitimate military components of its nuclear program under the umbrella of "peaceful purposes". Why should we believe the regime in Tehran now?
Rafael Ofek29/4/2013
[ . . . . ]Many around the world are tempted to believe, either out of naiveté or due to convenience, that the nuclear program is in fact a legitimate civilian program. Others alternatively believe that the State of Israel and the Jewish people are a disease that must be done away with, and therefore it is a good reason to support Iran.
Otherwise, it is difficult to understand why the nuclear discussions with Iran continue as though nothing has happened, even when it has turned out time and again that Iran is misleading the world. Indeed, Dr. Fereydoon Abbasi, president of the Iranian organization for nuclear energy and former Vice President of Iran, admitted in a September 2012 interview to the London-based newspaper Al Hayat that Iran has presented falsified facts to protect its nuclear program and conceal its technical progress in several fields. According to Abbasi, "We sometimes made it seem as though we were weaker than we actually were, and sometimes projected strength when we actually had nothing." He added that "many times, we delivered false information (to the IAEA inspectors) in order to protect our nuclear facilities and our accomplishments… we had no choice but to deceive the IAEA and the other spies." In Islamic Shiite culture, legitimacy for lies has always existed, in certain circumstances.
The term is known in Arabic as Al-Taqiyya, which means "the caution commitment", or loosely translated, means concealment or deception . . . .When Bush included Iran in the "Axis of Evil", he referred to its rogue nuclear conduct, among the rest. His words were made clearer in the midst of August 2002, when an Iranian opposition organization held a press conference in Washington DC, revealing for the first time that Iran was covertly establishing a facility for enriching uranium in Natanz as well as a heavy water reactor in Khondab, near Arak. The information was verified via satellite photography.
Despite its commitment according to the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran did not inform the IAEA in advance of the establishment of these nuclear facilities. Even though Iran initially denied the information entirely, the proof presented to it by IAEA director general Mohamed El Baradei brought it to confess it and agree to IAEA personnel inspections in Natanz . . . .
Iran also sought to have the heavy water reactor it was constructing near Arak 'approved' by the IAEA, and relieve the concern of the international community that the reactor was intended, based on its technical characteristics, for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. On May 2003, Aghazadeh presented a position paper to the IAEA staff in Vienna for clarifying his country's nuclear plan.
According to the document, Iran considered the possibility that some of the reactors that it would construct will be heavy water reactors based on the CANDU model, developed in the past by Canada. He thus sought to justify the need for a large heavy water research reactor, as well as an industrial facility for producing heavy water. As they are cooled and moderated by heavy water, these reactors have an advantage of light water reactors, as they utilize unenriched natural uranium fuel. However, this claim by Aghazadeh contradicted his words in February, when he guided El Baradei during his visit to Natanz, when he presented the uranium enrichment project as the central component in the electricity production power plant program. Furthermore, it was possible to refute his claim with the fact that even prior to 2000, all countries that developed or constructed power plants around the world, including Canada, tended towards abandoning the development of heavy reactors, due to economic reasons.
Iran had no economic rationale for focusing simultaneously on a heavy water power plant in addition to the light water power plants installed in the Bushehr facility . . . .
While Tehran found civilian justifications for the construction of the nuclear facilities, it faced difficulties in explaining the information presented to it by the IAEA that clearly point to efforts in developing a nuclear explosive device. However, Iran came up with several ways of dealing with the incriminating facts. Iran claimed that facts were inconclusive, such as the Polonium-210 discovered by IAEA inspectors at the Tehran Research Reactor, an isotope that Iran claimed was intended for civilian use in producing thermo-electric devices, and not for developing a neutron trigger for a nuclear weapons. Another way was by destroying evidence, including the total destruction of part of the Lavizan-Shian suburb in Tehran, including disposing of vast quantities of soil from the area, in order to conceal the existence of the PHRC facility that operated there earlier, and served the military nuclear program. Iran additionally denied the facts, claiming that they were fabricated and based on forged documents, and lastly, hiding behind the claim that the IAEA's findings pertain to fields that deal with Iran's security and are state secrets that have no nuclear aspect, such as the issue of the Parchin facility for testing explosives . . . .
The recent example for the false Iranian stories is from the end of December 2012. The New York Times quoted US and other Western officials who were under the impression that Iran had moderated its uranium enrichment program, in order to signal to the six large powers (P5+1) that it wishes to avoid a future confrontation over the Iranian issue. Therefore, they believe that Iran will be willing to reach a deal of some form with the west on this issue. During the last summer, evidence was received for this impression when Iran diverted a significant quantity of its 20% enriched uranium for the production of nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. At any rate, according to the assessment of a US official, the purpose of Iran's steps is to buy more time. In fact, Iran is moving with its nuclear dialogue with the IAEA and the P5+1 powers as though dancing a tango - one step forward and two steps back. The 'shuffling' on its part was expressed in talks with the IAEA delegation that arrived to Tehran during January 2013. As was reported by the media, the talks concluded without any results. At the end of January, Iran informed the IAEA that it intends to operate advanced centrifuges at its primary enrichment facility in Natanz, which will make it possible to significantly accelerate the uranium enrichment process.
This clearly points to the fact that Iran does not intend to withdraw its nuclear military program. It can be determined that the Iranian claim that the uranium it is enriching to a level of 20% is intended to produce fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor is clearly false. Its purpose is to serve as a 'cover story' for the program to continue enriching uranium to a level of 90% - weapons-grade quality for a nuclear weapon. It is possible that an examination of the issue of nuclear fuel, from a financial cost perspective, will show that it is cheaper to acquire it from abroad.
On one hand, the calculations indicate that as of November 2012, Iran has accumulated approximately 157 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium, which is sufficient for producing nuclear fuel for the reactor in Tehran for the next 25 years.
On the other hand, approximately 300 centrifuges are operated at the Natanz enrichment facility, enriching three kilograms of 20% enriched uranium, and approximately 700 centrifuges at the Fordow enrichment facility, with a monthly yield of 6.7 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium. Nevertheless, the installation of all the centrifuges at the facility, approximately 2,800,was recently completed, and it appears that all of them will be used for enriching uranium to a level of 20%. Once operational, the total monthly yield of enriched uranium at Natanz and Fordow will increase to 30kg of 20% enriched uranium. The obvious conclusion from these figures is that once all the centrifuges at the Fordow facility become operational, Iran will accumulate sufficient amounts of 20% enriched uranium to produce nuclear fuel for more than 40 years (including the amount produced thus far) or sufficient amounts for a nuclear bomb within seven or eight months . . .
The sprint for the nuke red line is on, and it is Spring 2013, which Israeli PM Netanyahu indicated would be a likely critical moment, last September at the UN General Assembly. Not good, but we need to track this. END
