Since this blog is subject to hostile scrutiny, I think it useful to mirror a UD post here as well.
Let me highlight, by clipping from the below:
There has been a miasma of scientism underwritten by
implicit or explicit materialism and a grossly extrapolated and
exaggerated view of the capacity of mechanisms of chance variation and
differential reproductive success to innovate body plan level structures
that has clouded clarity of thought and that has also created a highly
polarised, ideology-driven atmosphere on scientific reconstruction of
origins.
That is the sort of reason why some resort to hate sites, personal
attacks, smears, outright slander and libel etc. Not to mention
censorship, outing tactics, career busting and mafioso-style implied
gangsterish threats against family members. All they succeed in doing
when they act like that is to expose their want of basic broughtupcy,
and to highlight the utter moral bankruptcy of evolutionary materialism,
due to
its want of a worldview foundation IS adequate to ground OUGHT. Those
who act like this, and those who harbour them or indulge in enabling
passivity by not correcting them, or — worse — imagine that such
misbehaviour is legitimate free comment, show just how bankrupt their
thinking has become. From Plato in The Laws, Bk X,
this issue of nihilistic factions driven by evolutionary materialist
ideology has been a significant concern for the well-being of society.
I trust those who know just what I am speaking of, have enough conscience left to be ashamed. Let us further trust that they will now do better. (And if your conscience is too benumbed to be ashamed, that is a very bad sign.)
Okay, here is the post:
========
I have just now commented
in the recent thread on Dr Fuller’s thought, and think it useful to
headline for record (especially given some continued abusive
misbehaviour at Anti- Evo and linked sites that has come to my attention
in recent days):
____________
>> Let me clip a few thought-sparker cites from Dr Steve Fuller:
“The failure of intelligent design theory to specify the
intelligent designer constitutes both a rhetorical and an
epistemological disadvantage…The epistemological disadvantage is
subtler, namely, that intelligent design theory is unnecessarily forced
to adopt an instrumentalist philosophy of science, whereby its theory is
treated merely as a device for explaining particular phenomena (i.e. as
products of intelligent design) without allowing inferences to the best
explanation (i.e. the properties of the implied designer).” (171)
“I believe [it] is necessary [to] return to theology as the source of
theoretical guidance on the nature of the intelligent designer (Fuller
2008a).” (171)
“In short, by studiously avoiding the appeal to theological arguments
as part of their scientific explanations, intelligent design theorists
only inhibit their own ability to meet the opposition of Neo-Darwinian
apologists like Sober. Admittedly, making such appeals would mean not
only re-opening old theological debates but also making them part of
secular academic debate. A test of our collective intellectual maturity
will lie in our ability to tolerate such a newly charged situation. But
as it stands, intelligent design theory does itself no intellectual
favours by keeping the identity of the intelligent designer as vague as
Neo-Darwinians keep the identity of evolution, even if that practice
appears justified as politically expedient.” (173) . . . .
“…[M]y own interest in promoting intelligent design in schools, which
is much more positive than Johnson’s original worries about naturalism
turning into an established religion. I actually believe that the deep
theological roots of intelligent design theory provide a robust basis
for perpetuating the radical spirit of inquiry that marks both
philosophy and science at their best – not at their worst, as their
collective response to intelligent design has put on public display
(Fuller 2009b). As a true social constructivist (Fuller 2000b: Preface),
I see myself as one of the constructors of intelligent design theory. I
am not simply remarking from the sidelines about what others have done
or are doing, as a historian or a journalist might. Rather I am making a
front-line contribution to defining the theory’s identity.” (177)
“In terms of pedagogical implications, my support of intelligent
design goes beyond merely requiring that students learn the history and
philosophy of science alongside their normal studies. It involves
reengineering the science curriculum so that its history and philosophy
falls within its normal remit.” (180)
In my initial response, I first think that there is merit in raising
the issues of phil of sci and what I guess could be called philosophy of
nature, i.e. discourse on the relevant aspects of metaphysics etc.
Also, relevant history of science and of ideas is key context. A
familiarity with at least the sort of ideas on the nature and
limitations of scientific knowledge that Newton discussed in his General
Scholium and in Opticks, Query 31, will be a useful first nexus for all
of this.
That said, I would look on the strengths and limitations of knowledge
deriving from inductive inquiry (including abduction) and the inherent
open-endedness of science as a consequence, as a powerful way to clear
the air. There has been a miasma of scientism underwritten by
implicit or explicit materialism and a grossly extrapolated and
exaggerated view of the capacity of mechanisms of chance variation and
differential reproductive success to innovate body plan level structures
that has clouded clarity of thought and that has also created a highly
polarised, ideology-driven atmosphere on scientific reconstruction of
origins.
That is the sort of reason why some resort to hate sites, personal
attacks, smears, outright slander and libel etc. Not to mention
censorship, outing tactics, career busting and mafioso-style implied
gangsterish threats against family members. All they succeed in doing
when they act like that is to expose their want of basic broughtupcy,
and to highlight the utter moral bankruptcy of evolutionary materialism,
due to
its want of a worldview foundation IS adequate to ground OUGHT. Those
who act like this, and those who harbour them or indulge in enabling
passivity by not correcting them, or — worse — imagine that such
misbehaviour is legitimate free comment, show just how bankrupt their
thinking has become. From Plato in The Laws, Bk X,
this issue of nihilistic factions driven by evolutionary materialist
ideology has been a significant concern for the well-being of society.
But, as can be seen here, we are looking at phil context of
scientific knowledge, and at broad, philosophically and historically
informed questions of science in society. Worldviews and cultural
agendas and issues.
By contrast, as we narrow focus to the logic of inductive warrant
that makes certain ideas warranted as empirically reliable and useful
so far, we can see that — again from Newton et al on — there is
reasonable warrant for caution and what can be called, chastened or
humbled realism that embraces some degree of instrumentalism in
understanding scientific knowledge. Especially, on origins science
matters where in reconstructing a remote and unobservable past we must
rely on factual adequacy relating to traces of the past we can observe
today and tested signs of adequate dynamics to produce explanations on a
best current basis.
Where, instrumentalism can be set in relevant context with a clip from the Stanford Enc of Phil, article on Scientific Progress:
The instrumentalists follow Duhem in thinking that
theories are merely conceptual tools for classifying, systematizing and
predicting observational statements, so that the genuine content of
science is not to be found on the level of theories (Duhem 1954).
Scientific realists, by contrast, regard theories as attempts to
describe reality even beyond the realm of observable things and
regularities, so that theories can be regarded as statements having a
truth value. Excluding naive realists, most scientists are fallibilists
in Peirce’s sense: scientific theories are hypothetical and always
corrigible in principle. They may happen to be true, but we cannot know
this for certain in any particular case. But even when theories are
false, they can be cognitively valuable if they are closer to the truth
than their rivals (Popper 1963). Theories should be testable by
observational evidence, and success in empirical tests gives inductive
confirmation (Hintikka 1968; Niiniluoto and Tuomela 1973; Kuipers 2000)
or non-inductive corroboration to the theory (Popper 1959).
It might seem natural to expect that the main rival accounts of
scientific progress would be based upon the positions of instrumentalism
and realism. But this is only partly true. To be sure, naive realists
as a rule hold the accumulation-of-truths view of progress, and many
philosophers combine the realist view of theories with the axiological
thesis that truth is an important goal of scientific inquiry. A
non-cumulative version of the realist view of progress can be formulated
by using the notion of truthlikeness. But there are also philosophers
who accept the possibility of a realist treatment of theories, but still
deny that truth is a relevant value of science which could have a
function in the characterization of scientific progress. Bas van
Fraassen’s (1980) constructive empiricism takes the desideratum of
science to be empirical adequacy: what a theory says about the
observable should be true. The acceptance of a theory involves only the
claim that it is empirically adequate, not its truth on the theoretical
level. Van Fraassen has not developed an account of scientific progress
in terms of his constructive empiricism, but presumably such an account
would be close to empiricist notions of reduction and Laudan’s account
of problem-solving ability (see Section 3.2).
An instrumentalist who denies that theories have truth values usually
defines scientific progress by referring to other virtues theories may
have, such as their increasing empirical success. In 1908 Duhem
expressed this idea by a simile: scientific progress is like a mounting
tide, where waves rise and withdraw, but under this to-and-fro motion
there is a slow and constant progress. However, he gave a realist twist
to his view by assuming that theories classify experimental laws, and
progress means that the proposed classifications approach a “natural
classification” (Duhem 1954).
Evolutionary epistemology is open to instrumentalist (Toulmin) and
realist (Popper) interpretations. A biological approach to human
knowledge naturally gives emphasis to the pragmatist view that theories
function as instruments of survival. Darwinist evolution in biology is
not goal-directed with a fixed forward-looking goal; rather, species
adapt themselves to an ever changing environment. In applying this
account to the problem of knowledge-seeking, the fitness of a theory can
be taken to mean that the theory is accepted by members of the
scientific community. But a realist can reinterpret the evolutionary
model by taking fitness to mean the truth or truthlikeness of a theory .
. .
There is a lot of room for debates in there, but it should be clear
that scientific knowledge is inescapably provisional and that inductive
reasoning is only capable of a weak form warrant. Inductive knowledge
claims are not certain beyond correction. And, it is fair comment to
note that different scientific claims come with differing degrees of
corroboration and differing degrees of openness to empirical testing.
So, as we are less and less open to testing, and as the degree of
warrant decreases, we would be well advised to hold claims with a lesser
degree of certitude. In particular, the notion of a general
authority of Science that gives an imprimatur of practical certainty to
dominant theories is — for good reason — highly suspect.
In that context, I would hold that the design inference explanatory filter (addressed per aspect of a phenomenon or object etc) — and/or its equivalent in mathematically structured models of complex specified information
— is a legitimate approach to inferring cause on a best explanation
basis, in contexts where we do not have direct access to observe the
causal process in action. It is interesting in this context to see the
objections often made, that there is no independent access to the
inferred designer so the inference can be dismissed and denigrated. This
of course is ideologically loaded and begs the question that the reason
why we are inferring is that we need to see what inferred cause is best
adequate, given that we did not and often cannot observe the actual
causal process at work. In short, the objection is self-serving and
selectively hyperskeptical.
But to infer cause by design as process or mechanism, is manifestly
not to infer the identity or personal characteristics of the designer.
One may infer arson as cause of a fire without knowing the culprit. Of
course, that inferred deed may suggest a moral characteristic, but that
is a question of motives.
My broader point is that design as process is separable as a matter
of inductive investigation, from the identity or characteristics of the
candidate designers in question. All that a design inference
requires is a sufficiently open mind that is willing to accept the
possibility of design — not ruling it out a priori — and a willingness
to accept that various causal processes tend to leave characteristic
signs that can be tested and warranted as reliable signs of design.
With a growing toolbox of relevant techniques and signs in hand, one
has a perfect epistemic right to infer the causal process on the
observed sign.
One may then wish to debate characteristics of candidate designers, but that is a further exercise.
Where prof Fuller is quite right to be concerned, is the point that
what is happening is that an institutionally dominant ideological school
— we can term it a priori evolutionary materialist scientism — is
trying to censor the reasonable process of inference in the interests of
their school. So, ironically, they have made the penumbra of issues and
concerns above highly relevant to a fair evaluation of scientific
practice, science education, and to science, society and good
citizenship concerns.
In particular as we see science professors championing atheism in the
name of science — never mind the sophomoric bluster typically involved —
and as we see them embracing, using, enabling and harbouring
nihilistic, amoral, might/manipulation makes ‘right’ tactics
and as we see them championing the ill-considered distortion of
foundational societal and cultural institutions, they are the best
argument as to why evolutionary materialistic scientism and secular
humanism are intellectually and morally bankrupt and a positive danger
to the well-being of our civilisation.
So, we do have to set science in the context of ideas and issues, and
in the wider context of impact on society. But, I still think that the
inference to design as cause is properly distinct from that wider
connexion. Sufficiently so, that we may undertake a technical inquiry as
to how well warranted the design inference is. The answer to that is
actually blatant: very well warranted indeed, especially as we focus on functionally specific complex organisation and associated information [FSCO/I],
the relevant form of CSI. Especially where the info is in the form of
digitally coded algorithmic or linguistic symbol strings.
That is why many thoughtful people hold and will continue to hold for
the foreseeable future, that C-chemistry, aqueous medium cell based
life that pivots on DNA is designed. The supportive, fine tuned physics
of the observed cosmos that supports that also warrants a design
inference. So does the information-centric nature of body plans and key
features of life forms, like the bird lung or wing and the human vocal
apparatus and language ability.
We are not going away, and we are not perverse or perverted to hold
such views. The resort to slander-laced smears, cruel mockery, outing
tactics and threats against careers or family simply underscores the
moral bankruptcy and ill-will of objectors who resort to such, or
passively enable or harbour such.
We are here, we are qualified to address scientific and linked phil,
history of ideas and societal issues. We have good reason to call for
reform in science, in the academy, in education, in the media, and in
society. We are not going away, and we will stoutly defend our
reputations, careers, families and civilisation against such
ideologically motivated bully-boy tactics.
And, at length, we will prevail.>>
____________
Since this is a comment in a fresh thread, I encourage comments there, and comments will be disabled here.
========
A response to issues, and in light of recent bully-boy tactics at hostile sites. END
