I am troubled at the "definitions" of atheism on offer

 

As we may readily see, we are challenged by a going concern world, leading to core first hard questions regarding the roots of reality.  One of these, is the reality of God, and we often encounter (especially online) those who deny the reality of God, i.e. atheists.

 But, on consulting the Oxford Handbook of Atheism, we find a riot of patently disparate (and arguably inadequately structured) proposed definitions:

Even today . . . there is no clear, academic consensus as to how exactly the term should be used. For example, consider the following definitions of ‘atheism’ or ‘atheist’, all taken from serious scholarly writings published in the last ten years:

1. ‘Atheism […] is the belief that there is no God or gods’ (Baggini 2003: 3)
2. ‘At its core, atheism […] designates a position (not a “belief”) that includes or asserts no god(s)’ (Eller 2010: 1)
3. ‘[A]n atheist is someone without a belief in God; he or she need not be someone who believes that God does not exist’ (Martin 2007: 1)
4. ‘[A]n atheist does not believe in the god that theism favours’ (Cliteur 2009: 1)
5. ‘By “atheist,” I mean precisely what the word has always been understood to mean—a principled and informed decision to reject belief in God’ (McGrath 2004: 175) [Bullivant, Ch 1]

Immediately, 1 is about the belief that there is no God (or gods simply confuses the matter as a small-g god is nothing like God). 2 speaks of a “position” as opposed to a belief, evidently wishing to imply that the position is evidently warranted enough to be knowledge. This fails to acknowledge that claimed warranted, credibly true beliefs – claimed knowledge – still remain as beliefs, even if they are planks of a worldview (a “position”); even before we fail to find adequate warrant . . . is that why some atheists try to suggest theirs is the “default” view?

3 speaks of being “without a belief in God,” but a newborn child is not an atheist. Nor is the lizard living in my kitchen window.

It also seeks to evade the generally understood point that atheists actively deny the existence of God, with implication that they claim to have good cause for such denial. 4 seems to restate aspects of 3, but by using a lower case g, fails to distinguish superhuman entities such as Apollo or Thor or Isis etc., from the inherently good, utterly wise Creator, a necessary (so, eternal, reality root) and maximally great being, the God of ethical theism.

It is 5 that speaks of principled and informed decision to reject belief in God, but that would enfold agnosticism which denies having adequate warrant for theistic belief as opposed to denial of the reality of God.

The more popular level Wikipedia only manages to confirm the riot of disparities (and theism is short for Monotheism, it is not to be conflated with polytheism etc):

Atheism, in the broadest sense, is an absence of belief in the existence of deities. Less broadly, atheism is a rejection of the belief that any deities exist. In an even narrower sense, atheism is specifically the position that there are no deities. Atheism is contrasted with theism, which in its most general form is the belief that at least one deity exists.

The American Atheists try to be clever, but evidently only manage to be artfully evasive – again, a newborn child is manifestly not an atheist – and, again, small-g “gods” are ontologically different from the necessary being, reality root, inherently good, utterly wise Creator and maximally great, Supreme Being of ethical theism:

Atheism is not an affirmative belief that there is no god nor does it answer any other question about what a person believes. It is simply a rejection of the assertion that there are gods. Atheism is too often defined incorrectly as a belief system. To be clear: Atheism is not a disbelief in gods or a denial of gods; it is a lack of belief in gods.

One is tempted to say, that by conflating gods and God, atheism advocates are setting up a strawman, the better to knock it over. While, we may have a right to that inference n the case of highly educated thought leaders who are duty-bound to know the difference between the ontological status of God and that of gods, in most cases, I think we are looking at deep rooted conceptual confusion. Perhaps unflatteringly ignorant, but not willful negligence or outright calculated deceit.

It is clear, that when atheists choose to disbelieve in God, they imply or assume that they have a good enough reason that such disbelief or denial or rejection – it is certainly not merely passive absence of belief – is warranted. Certainly, that is reflected in the Dawkinsian type sneer or attitude: ignorant, stupid, insane or wicked.

However, the logic of being (ontological) hole soon emerges, once we see talking points like, we believe in one fewer gods than you theists do. Or, in the question, who made God, or who designed the designer or the like. For example, in answering ontological or cosmological arguments, atheists may speak of teapots floating in space, or pink elephants or a maximally evil being or the like. In challenging theists on the root of moral reality, they too often resurrect the Euthyphro dilemma, between good/evil is the capricious, arbitrary will of a god, or is independent of the god.

All of these are conceptually misdirected.

Here, it will help to think in terms of possible worlds. Such, being sufficiently complete descriptions of the way our common world . . . or some other suggested or actualised world . . . is, was, or may be: states of affairs. We may then consider entities or beings (or candidates to be such) across that gamut. Some candidates, like a Eucledean Plane square circle, cannot be in any world, as core characteristics are mutually contradictory. These, are impossible of being: yes, the first law of logic applies to the logic of being, something A is itself, A, in light of its core characteristics.

Others, are possible, such as fires, triangles, numbers, us.

Some, may be in some worlds, but not in others; contingent beings. Contingent beings are causally dependent and may have a beginning, an end, and enabling factors.

By contrast, necessary beings will be present in every possible world as part of the required fabric for any such world to exist. For example try to imagine a distinct world W in which two-ness begins, or ceases, or is absent. Manifestly impossible, as W being distinct from say its close neighbour W’ already implies distinction, so, twoness. Two brings with it 0, 1, 2, 3 . . . and the familiar sets N, Z, Q, R, C, and even the hyperreals R* etc. Yes, that is already a very good reason for the universal power of mathematics, the study of the logic of structure and quantity. An extension of the logic of being, ontology.

(And no, Mathematics, handmaiden and enabler of empirical sciences, is not itself such a science. Scientism is discredited from its outset. No, Big-S science does not utterly monopolise or dominate knowledge. It certainly is not Lewontin’s only begetter of truth.)

Right next door to our ABC’s and 123’s, some of the most profound things lurk: infinity, infinitesimals, eternality (as, necessary beings have no beginning or end . . . ), the root of reality, much more. (See, here, and here [more technical].)

There is a further characteristic of a serious candidate necessary being: either, it is impossible of being or else it is actual. For, if not impossible, possible and existing in at least one possible world. But also, not contingent, not causally dependent, so eternal and pervasive across worlds as we saw for two-ness. Similarly, ponder the empty set {}, yes THE as there is just one. Not in any museum display, everywhere influential, invoked even by von Neuman to construct N thence ZQRCR* etc. {} → 0, {0} → 1, {0,1} → 2, . . . {0,1,2 . . . } → ω omega, the first transfinite ordinal. Dare I suggest, too, pervasively present?

Now, too, our going concern world has year after year in succession, it is temporal, causal and thermodynamically constrained: while energy is conserved, it is also degraded; pointing to eventual heat death as cosmic concentrations of energy are used up. But, pointing to the remote past, this has a logic of being result. For, we cannot traverse a transfinite span in successive, cumulative steps. That is, the past of origins is inherently finite, even beyond the big bang. It is false that the past has been transfinite, there was a finitely remote beginning for any world physical enough for the statistics of particle or molecule interactions to give rise to the laws of thermodynamics. 

Where, also, our world cannot have come from a true nothing, utter non-being. Were there ever such non-being, as such can have no causal power, that utter non-being would endure. That is, as a world now is, at finite remove we have a necessary being world root.

Yet further, we are morally governed, right down to the core of our rational being. We have branch on which we all sit duties to truth, right reason, warrant (and wider prudence), and so forth. After Hume’s guillotine that calls for a root able to bridge the is-ought gap. That requires inherent goodness and utter, but in key parts intelligible wisdom. For that, there is just one serious candidate, as has been noted (but which needs to be hammered home): the inherently good, utterly wise creator God, a necessary and maximally great being. The God of ethical theism.

Now, too, as no one seriously proposes that God is causally dependent, we are dealing here with a serious candidate world root. So, either impossible of being or else actual as the required world root. Where, as of the impact of Plantinga’s free will defense, there is no plausible argument that God, thus understood, is impossible of being. So, credibly actual.

A critical, epochal result. END